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Abstract
The best extant demarcation of logical constants, due to Tarski, classifies logical con-
stants by invariance properties of their denotations. This classification is developed
in a framework which presumes that the denotations of all expressions are definite.
However, some indefinite expressions, such as Russell’s indefinite description operator
η, Hilbert’s ε, and abstraction operators such as ‘the number of’, appropriately in-
terpreted, are logical. I generalize the Tarskian framework in such a way as to allow
a reasonable account of the denotations of indefinite expressions. This account gives
rise to a principled classification of the denotations of logical and non-logical indefi-
nite expressions. After developing this classification and its application to particular
cases in some detail, I show how this generalized framework allows a novel view of the
logical status of certain abstraction operators such as ‘the number of’. I then show
how we can define surrogate abstraction operators directly in higher-order languages
augmented with an ε-operator.
∗Thanks to Aldo Antonelli, Paul Benacerraf, John Burgess, Paul Egré, William Hanson,
Robbie Hirsch, Barry Maguire, Jimmy Martin, Noel Swanson, and a couple of anonymous
referees for valuable feedback. Thanks also to audiences at the Bristol Postgraduate Confer-
ence in Philosophy at Bristol University and the Logic, Truth, and Language Conference at




We have known since Tarski’s 1936 “The Concept of Logical Consequence” how
to develop a precise account of logical truth and consequence given a fixed set
of logical expressions. We typically fix these logical constants by enumeration.
‘And’, ‘not’, and ‘every’ are logical constants. ‘Square’, ‘the father of’, ‘Jack’,
and ‘is larger than’ are not. This sort of procedure is more than adequate for
most mathematical applications since the consequence relation developed à la
Tarski on the back of conjunction, negation, identity, and a quantifier or two
suffices to characterize a wide array of mathematical structures. When we turn a
more philosophical eye towards accurately characterizing the concepts of logical
truth and logical consequence as they appear in the informal background logic
with which we actually do mathematics, things get more complicated. Though
our list seems adequate in the main, there is no obvious principled connection
between those expressions on the list and those not. Philosophers and logicians
have thus attempted to give a principled account of the members of the list that
explains why ‘and’ and ‘every’ are logical, why ‘square’ and ‘Bob’ are not, and
that settles in a reasonable way disputed cases like ‘is identical to’ and ‘most’.
One of these attempts, also initiated by Tarski, has risen almost to the level
of widespread acceptance in more mathematical contexts: logical expressions
are those whose meaning does not depend on the characteristics of particular
objects.
Since logical constants do not depend for their meaning on the characteris-
tics of particular objects, their meaning should not change if we switch objects
around or substitute some objects for others. Working within a widely held
model of the denotations of various expressions, we can develop a formal ana-
logue of this intuitive constraint, selecting out a set of objects invariant under
certain transformations as the potential denotations of logical constants. This
framework, though useful, carries with it certain limiting presumptions about
the potential meaning of expressions in the language it is modeling. In particu-
lar, the framework presumes that the meanings of all expressions are definite in
a precise sense spelled out below. This presumption systematically perverts the
intended meanings of indefinite expressions such as the English indefinite arti-
cle. So perverted, indefinite expressions have no hope of being logical constants.
However, indefinite expressions are common enough in informal mathematical
reasoning and plausible enough as candidate logical constants that our best
principled account of logical constants should not exclude them by being built
on an inadequately accommodating framework.
My aim in this paper is to amend this framework to allow indefinite expres-
sions a reasonable chance at logicality. The structure of the paper is as follows.
In 2, I describe Tarski’s account of logical truth and logical consequence. In
2.1, I turn to describing the standard framework in which the invariance crite-
rion of logicality has its home, show how the invariance criterion classifies the
denotations of various expressions as logical and non-logical, and explain the
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intuition behind the criterion. Section 2.2 is a discussion of the adequacy of this
criterion as a classification of the logical status of indefinite expressions. Hav-
ing seen that the criterion is inadequate by virtue of the presumptions of the
framework, I propose in sections 3 and 3.1 a more general framework without
such presumptions and show how to extend the invariance criterion to this new
setting. Section 4 examines the consequences of this extended criterion for a
number of cases: a version of Hilbert’s ε operator [4.1], abstraction operators
[4.2], and a new type of abstraction operator defined from ε [4.3]. I close in 5
by summarizing the reasons for accepting my proposed amendment of Tarski’s
framework and the resulting criterion of logicality.
2 Tarski on Logical Truth and Logical Consequence
A logical truth is a sentence true in virtue of its logical form. A sentence A is
a logical consequence of some sentences B0, . . . , Bn if the truth of A is guaran-
teed by the truth of B0, . . . , Bn,. . . in virtue of the logical form of A and the
logical form of the Bs. (Tarski 1936) gives an analysis of ‘true in virtue of log-
ical form’ according to which a sentence is a logical truth if and only if every
way of reinterpreting the non-logical expressions occurring within A results in
a true sentence. Likewise A is a logical consequence of B0, . . . , Bn, . . . if every
way of reinterpreting the non-logical expressions occurring within A and the
Bs that makes all of the Bs true makes A true. With one small amendment,
Tarski’s analysis has become the standard account of logical truth and logical
consequence.
The amendment concerns the connection between true sentences containing
only logical vocabulary and logical truths. We can express claims about how
many things there are using only standard logical vocabulary. This means that
according to the above account such sentences are logical truths. This has the
frustrating upshot that sentences expressing facts which are presumably not ca-
pable of being sussed out a priori are nonetheless logical truths.1 Contemporary
accounts of logical truth avoid this consequence and others by modifying the
above definition like so: a sentence is a logical truth if and only if no matter
what things there are, every way of reinterpreting the non-logical expressions
occurring within A results in a true sentence. Similarly for logical consequence.
The technical details of Tarski’s approach and our modern variants are not im-
portant for this paper, so I set them aside. Details that matter will be filled
in below. Almost all of what I say below can be easily adapted to the older
approach and, in fact, the results in 4.3 are even better on that approach.2
1See (Hanson 1997, section 1) for a discussion of problems with the older style of approach
relating to the aprioricity of logic. These concerns, unfortunately, are beyond the scope of this
paper. Doing them and other concerns about the nature of logic justice would require much
fuller treatment than I can manage here. I hope to address this issue elsewhere.
2I also bracket the interesting historical question of whether Tarski had the amended version
already in mind, but failed to mention this due to the informality of the paper. See (Gómez-
Torrente 2000), (Hanson 1997), (Etchemendy 1990), and (Sher 1991) for discussions of this
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Tarski’s definition depends on a distinction between logical and non-logical
expressions. In his 1936 paper, Tarski expresses doubt about whether a pre-
cise criterion of logicality for expressions could be found. He suggests that
though it might be possible to find “objective” arguments that justified the tra-
ditional choices of logical constants—the monadic quantifiers ‘every’ and ‘there
is’, negation, conjunction, etc.—it might also turn out that his analysis yields
only a definition of logical truth relative to a choice of logical constants. In
later work Tarski suggests a criterion that distinguishes logical from non-logical
notions where notions are, in a sense to be spelled out precisely below, the
denotations of expressions.3 His approach is entirely extensional; he does not
distinguish between expressions with different meanings that denote the same
notion. What he offers can be viewed as a necessary condition for being a logical
constant–a logical constant denotes a logical notion—and a necessary and suffi-
cient condition for being a logical notion. This goes some way towards settling
the choice of logical constants though, as he notes, it does not fully settle the
question about logical truth and logical consequence.
2.1 Tarski’s Invariance Criterion
To spell out the details of Tarski’s criterion, we need to introduce a bit of
terminology. We define a type-symbol as follows:
• ‘e’ and ‘t’ are type-symbols.
• If S1, . . . , Sn, and S are type-symbols, (S1, S2, . . . , Sn ⇒ S) is a type
symbol.
Given a set of objects (a domain) D, we interpret the type-symbols defined
above against D thus:
• e denotes D
• t denotes {T,F}
• (S1, S2, . . . , Sn ⇒ S) denotes the set of functions from the Cartesian
product of S1, . . . , Sn to S.
For example, (e ⇒ t) denotes the set of functions from D to {T, F} and
((e ⇒ t) ⇒ t) the set of functions from functions from D to {T, F} to {T, F}.
When the right-hand side of a type-symbol is ‘t’, the members of the denoted
type will be characteristic functions. We can be slightly perverse and identify
a set with its characteristic function and think of, for example, (e ⇒ t) being
a set of subsets of D (the power set). Likewise, we can think of ((e ⇒ t) ⇒ t)
as the power set of the power set of the domain. Taking the union of all the
matter and (Mancosu 2010) for an updated survey of the current evidence on offer.
3See (Tarski 1986). Tarski’s discussion therein is limited to logical notions. He articulates
a clear connection between logical constants and logical notions in (Tarski and Givant 1987,
57) where, in the context of developing set theory in a variable-free formalism, he gives the de-
notation of a logical notion as a necessary and sufficient condition for being a logical constant.
Thanks to a helpful reviewer.
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interpretations of all the type-symbols, we obtain a collection of sets we can call
the type-hierarchy over D.
A notion-in-extension σ is a function that assigns, to some domains D, some
element σD of the type-hierarchy over D.4 A total notion is one defined on every
domain. We can understand expressions as picking out notions-in-extension. So,
for example, the English quantifiers or the formal symbols ∃, ∀ pick out notions
that assign to every domain D a function of type ((e ⇒ t) ⇒ t). Again being
slightly perverse, ‘∀’ picks out the singleton of the domain {D} and ‘∃’ the set
consisting of non-empty subsets of the domain. Type 〈1〉 generalized quantifiers
such as ‘There are at least four’ and ‘There are finitely many’ can likewise be
treated as picking out subsets of the power set of the domain. Type 〈1, 1〉 quan-
tifiers such as ‘as many A as B’ are of type (((e⇒ t), (e⇒ t))⇒ t) and can thus
be thought of as subsets of the Cartesian product of the power set with itself.5
And so on. Notions are presumed to be total unless otherwise noted. Partial
notions have a tenuous claim to logicality, failing to have universal application.6
Many distinct expressions of natural language will pick out the same notion.
‘Universal quantification’ picks out the notion that sends a domain to its single-
ton, but so does ‘mock universal quantification’ which is universal quantification
if there are at least 43 things and existential otherwise.7 The expressions here
differ in meaning, so we are not classifying expressions, whether natural or for-
mal, as logical or non-logical, but only notions.
Tarski’s approach to classifying notions as logical proceeds in terms of in-
variance of notions under permutations of the domain. As McGee puts it:
Any operation which is disturbed by a permutation must somehow
discriminate among individuals in the domain, and any consideration
which discriminates among individuals lies beyond the reach of logic,
whose concerns are entirely general. (McGee 1996)
A permutation of a set is a bijection (one-to-one correspondence) from it to itself.
Given a permutation π of a domain D, we can extend π in a straightforward
way to a function π+ on all members of the type-hierarchy over D. We set
π+(T ) = T , π+(F ) = F . For all d in D, let π+(d) = π(d). For an ordered
n-tuple 〈m1, . . . ,mn〉 of members of the type-hierarchy,
π+(〈m1, . . . ,mn〉) = 〈π+(m1), . . . , π+(mn)〉.
Given a function f from Si to Sj , π+(f) is the function composed of π+, f , and
the inverse of π+: π+ ◦ (f ◦ π+−1). It is easy to check that this is the function
4I will typically abbreviate this to ‘notion’.
5See (Peters and Westerståhl 2006) for a useful overview of generalized quantifiers.
6This point will be discussed further below in the context of abstraction operators defined
only on domains of a certain cardinality.
7That is, if there are actually 43 things. There are other potential problems with expres-
sions which are universal quantification on domains with more than 43 things and existential
otherwise.
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g from π+(Si) to π+(Sj) such that
g(π+(x)) = π+(y) iff f(x) = y.
When f is a characteristic function, then we can simplify the above since π+ is
constant on t. Writing Cf for {α | f(α) = T},
π+(Cf ) = π
+({α, β, . . .}) = {π+(α), π+(β), . . .}.
We will say that σD is invariant under π iff π+(σD) = σD and σD is permutation
invariant iff σD is invariant under π for every permutation π on D. We can now
formulate Tarski’s criterion of logicality.
Tarski’s Criterion of Logicality. A notion is logical just in case on every
domain it denotes a permutation-invariant member of the type-hierarchy of that
domain8
This is not quite right—a quantifierW that denotes the operation of existen-
tial quantification on domains containing wombats and universal quantification
otherwise is sensitive to the characteristics of the particular individuals making
up the domain, but passes Tarski’s criterion with flying colors.9 We can fix this
problem and others like it by moving from invariance under permutations of a
domain to invariance under isomorphisms between domains.10
As with permutations, given an isomorphism ζ from D to D′ we can induce
a function ζ+ from the type-hierarchy over D to the type-hierarchy over D′
exactly as above. We will say that σD is invariant under ζ : D → D′ iff
ζ+(σD) = σD
′
and σD is isomorphism invariant iff σD is invariant under ζ for
every isomorphism ζ with domain D. A notion σ is isomorphism invariant if
σD is isomorphism invariant for every domain D.
Tarskian Criterion of Logicality. A notion is logical just in case on every
domain it denotes an isomorphism-invariant member of the type-hierarchy of
that domain.
The notions denoted by the usual logical constants are isomorphism invari-
ant. Consider the operation of universal quantification. If ζ is an isomorphism
between D and D′ then
{ζ(d) | d ∈ D} = D′ so ζ+(∀D) = {D′} = ∀D
′
.
8This account, developed in the posthumous (Tarski 1986), was anticipated by (Mautner
1946).
9The example is inspired by McGee’s discussion of wombat disjunction in (McGee 1996).
10An isomorphism between domains is simply a bijection or one-to-one correspondence.
Because of this, the property of isomorphism invariance is sometimes called invariance under
bijections. Note that one-to-one correspondences between domains typically do not extend to
isomorphisms between structures in the model-theoretic sense.
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So the operation of universal quantification is isomorphism invariant. A little
work confirms that all the usual logical constants are isomorphism invariant.11
Consider now the relation ≺ which holds between a, b ∈ D iff a is less than or
equal to b and they are both positive integers. For any isomorphism ζ from Z+
to N, ζ+(≺Z+) 6=≺N, since 0 ⊀N i for i in N. A little work confirms that typical
non-logical expressions are not isomorphism invariant.
2.2 Adequacy of the Isomorphism Invariance Criterion
Isomorphism invariance enjoys widespread acceptance as a demarcation of log-
ical notions in mathematical contexts such as abstract model theory.12 Insofar
as philosophers make use of a principled semantic criterion of logicality, the
going account is that logical constants denote isomorphism-invariant notions.13
I have no objection to taking isomorphism invariance as the criterion of logi-
cality for notions. However, it is inadequate as a full classification of the de-
notations of expressions into the logical and the non-logical. The isomorphism
invariance criterion only classifies denotations of expressions that can be rep-
resented as functions from domains to members of the appropriate type in the
type-hierarchy over those domains.14 Not all expressions of natural or logico-
mathematical language are usefully thought of this way. Russell’s indefinite
and definite description operators η and ι, Hilbert’s ε operator, and abstraction
operators such as ‘the number of’ are all cases of expressions which do not fit
nicely into the framework just given. These operators have some claim to being
logical constants so we should extend our framework in a principled way to allow
the isomorphism invariance criterion to give a verdict on their status.
η, ι, ε, and abstraction operators are all examples of what are sometimes
called “variable-binding term operators”.15 They attach to formulas with one
11All truth-functions come out as trivially logical on the invariance criterion. We can give
a more nuanced account of the logical status of the truth-functions, but doing so here would
be a distraction.
12See (Barwise 1974) and (Lindström 1966). (Väänänen 2004) contains a useful overview
of both Barwise and Lindström’s work and subsequent developments.
13See, for example, Kit Fine’s use of invariance criteria to distinguish good from bad ab-
straction principles in (Fine 2008). Solomon Feferman (Feferman 1999) and Denis Bonnay
(Bonnay 2008) have developed more subtle variations on the isomorphism invariance criterion
with the aim to exclude quantifiers like ‘There are ℵ18 many’. Such variations do not matter
for the treatment of indefinite expressions like Hilbert’s ε and Russell’s η—my suggestion for
these cases can easily be modified for any extant variation. My later treatment of abstrac-
tion operators, and, in particular, my account of the logical status of ε-abstraction operators,
would need to be modified. For example, my treatment of the logical status of Hume’s princi-
ple requires that = is a logical constant, which it is not on Feferman’s account. The question
of how my treatment of abstraction operators fares on accounts like Bonnay or Feferman’s,
suitably amended, would take us too far afield from my present purpose. I hope to address it
elsewhere. There is also an entirely separate tradition of proof-theoretic accounts of logicality
arising from (Gentzen 1935). See also (Dummett 1993). The relationship between this latter
tradition and the account discussed here is beyond the scope of this paper.
14This is not a peculiarity of my exposition of the invariance criterion. It is a common
assumption in the literature on permutation invariance.
15The theory of variable-binding term operators is developed in (Corcoran, Hatcher, and
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or more free variables to form a term that denotes an object in the domain. η,
for example, attaches to a formula A(x) with x free to form the term η.xA(x)
which denotes an arbitrary object o in the domain that satisfies A(x). If there
is no such object, η.xA(x) fails to denote. ε is a total version of η; ε.xA(x)
denotes an arbitrary object from the domain if A(x) is unsatisfiable. In our
present framework, variable-binding term operators have to denote functions of
type ((e⇒ t)⇒ e); that is, total functions from the power set of the domain to
the domain.16 It is a trivial fact that no total function of this type in the type-
hierarchy over a non-singleton domain is permutation invariant, a fortiori that
no total function of this type is isomorphism invariant. If we force the denotation
of expressions like ε into Tarski’s framework, we would face the unpleasant
choice of rejecting the Tarski-Mautner criterion of logicality or accepting that
no variable-binding term operator denotes a logical notion. Fortunately, we do
not have to face this choice. We can adapt our framework in a natural way to
allow a principled and non-trivial demarcation of the logical from the non-logical
variable-binding term operators.
3 Modifying the Framework
There are two problems involved in modifying our framework. The less serious
problem has to do with partial functions. It was implicitly assumed above that
that a member of a type (T1, . . . , Tn ⇒ S) is a total function on the denota-
tions of T1, . . . , Tn. However, some expressions do not denote total functions.




δ if X = {δ}
undefined otherwise
We can fix this problem by expanding the type-hierarchy to allow partial func-
tions. We interpret (Si ⇒ Sj) as denoting the set of functions from subsets
of Si to Sj ; analogously for more complex types. This is a friendly amend-
ment, clearly in the spirit of Tarski’s approach. It does require complicating
definitions of satisfaction to accommodate non-denoting expressions, but such
complications are not relevant here.18 No change is necessary for our account
of isomorphism invariance and applying it to ι gives the desired result that ι
Herring 1972) and (da Costa 1980).
16Of course, this is only on the presumption that a closed term like η.xA(x) denotes, on
a domain, an entity if A(x) is satisfiable. If we do not require this, we could—as I discuss
below—interpret η and like operators in such a way that this does not happen. On at least
one way of doing this, the resulting denotation of η is isomorphism invariant. However, this
way of interpreting the denotation of η does not accurately represent its intended meaning.
17ι can be interpreted as a total function though this interpretation is not especially natural.
(Scott 1967) does this by positing an object outside the ordinary domain of discourse for
ι.xA(x) to denote when A(x) is not uniquely satisfied. This is a convenient way of modeling
ι for certain purposes, but it does violence to the intended meaning of this expression.
18Presumably we need such complications anyways to deal with the many expressions of
ordinary natural and mathematical language that cannot be assumed to denote.
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is a logical operator. We will assume this amendment in the remainder of our
discussion.
3.1 Indefinite Expressions and Generalized Notions
The more serious problem arises with operators like η and ε. The denotation
of ι on a domain is the unique partial function that takes singletons to their
members. The objects denoted by closed terms such as ι.xA(x) are thus deter-
mined by the domain. Indefinite expressions like Russell’s η and Hilbert’s ε are
different. The domain does not determinately specify a single object to serve
as the denotation of a closed term like ε.xA(x), since the closed terms formed
with ε and η denote arbitrary satisfiers of the formula the operators attach to.
Modeling this sort of arbitrariness is not entirely straightforward. A first ap-
proach is to assign arbitrary, but definite functions of the appropriate type to ε
and η on every domain. This would fail to distinguish the notion denoted by η,
say, from the notion denoted by some definite expression that denotes the same
function as η on every domain, but, as noted above, many distinct expressions
intuitively differing in meaning will denote the same notion. A more worrisome
consequence of this approach is that the notion assigned to η and ε will not be
isomorphism invariant and thus will fail the Tarski-Mautner test for logicality.
However, the intended meanings of ε and η are not sensitive to underlying char-
acteristics of the members of the domain. Since this property was what we are
trying to model with isomorphism invariance, something has gone wrong in our
account of the meanings of these expressions.
On the approach just mooted, η denotes on any domain D an arbitrary
partial function from the set of non-empty subsets of D to D such that for all
X ⊆ D, ηD(X) ∈ X.19 Such a function is called a ‘choice function’.20 Note
that any choice function on this set would do exactly as well as any other as the
denotation of η.21 Our first attempt at specifying a denotation for η misses this
fact. What the domain determines for the denotation of η is not a particular
function, but rather a range of admissible functions which, in some sense, could
serve as the denotation of η. Our account of the denotation of operators like η
and ε should respect this fact. We can do so by slightly generalizing our account
19Strictly speaking, a function f of type ((e ⇒ t) ⇒ e) is a choice function if for all g of
type (e⇒ t), g(f(g)) = T if the range of g is not {F}.
20The denotation of ε on a domain is a slight extension of a choice function with an arbitrary
member of the domain assigned to ∅ to make ε total. I will also call this a choice function to
simplify my exposition. No confusion should arise.
21The assignment of choice functions as the denotations of operators like η or ε presumes
that such operators are extensional in the sense that their application to distinct, but co-
extensional formulas results in distinct complex expressions having the same denotation. This
is natural given the extensional framework we are working in. We could develop a version
of my account without this presumption, but this would require complicating the framework
in ways that would obscure my main point. If one objects to taking quasi-natural-language
expressions like ε and η as extensional, let the meaning of ε and η be regarded as stipulated.
So regarded, their meaning is clear and extensional.
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of the denotations of expressions.
Let a generalized notion be a function which sends some domains D to a
set of objects of the same type as one another in the type-hierarchy over D.
A total generalized notion is a generalized notion defined on every domain. We
can take the denotation of expressions such as η and ε to be generalized notions;
the former will denote the function sending D to the set of choice functions on
the non-empty subsets of D, the latter to the set of choice-functions on the full
power set. We can also take the denotation of expressions that are more defi-
nite to be generalized notions. What a domain determines for the denotation
of ι can be seen as a range of admissible functions, but in this case there is
always only one. Using σD now to denote the image of the generalized notion
denoted by σ on D, ιD is always the singleton containing the function from all
singletons in the power set of D to their members. Let a definite generalized
notion be one whose denotation on every domain is a singleton. An indefinite
generalized notion is one whose denotation on some domains is not a singleton.22
Since we can view a set of functions of type T as the characteristic set of a
function of type (T ⇒ t), it is tempting to identify the denotation of an expres-
sion like ε with a function of slightly higher type. The account of expressions
like ε and η is not best developed in this way; we want to distinguish cleanly
between the denotation of a predicate of functions of type ((e ⇒ t) ⇒ e)—
which is of type (((e ⇒ t) ⇒ e) ⇒ t)—and the set of choice functions assigned
to an expression like ε. This means that if we want to preserve the fact that
these expressions function differently at the level of their denotations, we need
to distinguish between a set of objects of type T and a function of type (T ⇒ t).
And we do want to preserve this fact since we want ε.xF (x) to be a referential
expression.23 The use of generalized notions allows us a formal representation of
the indefiniteness of certain denotations which allows us to preserve the thought
that term-forming operators like ε really are referential expressions—i.e. their
semantic type is of the form “. . .⇒ e)”—of a certain indefinite sort.
Using generalized notions instead of Tarskian notions allows us to mark
distinctions which are otherwise obscured. The indefinite generalized notion
denoted by η is isomorphism invariant.
Proof. Given D,D′, let ζ be an isomorphism from D to D′. We show ζ+(ηD) =
ηD
′
. Given f ∈ ηD, ζ+(f) = ζ+ ◦ (f ◦ ζ+−1). This is a choice function on the
22We assume that generalized notions are undefined on domains where their denotation
would otherwise be ∅. Nothing turns on how we accommodate partial generalized notions.
23We could also move up the denotations of all expressions, but the resulting account differs
from my account only in labeling. Note that no matter how we proceed, we have to amend
Tarski’s framework in some fashion if we want to maintain that ε.xF (x) is a well-formed
referential expression which denotes something along the lines of ‘the result of applying that
which is denoted by ε to that which is denoted by F (x)’ while also maintaining that the
denotation of ε is isomorphism invariant. I will use my terminology in what follows, though I
acknowledge that this is somewhat a matter of taste.
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power set of D′ and is thus in ηD
′
. So ζ+(ηD) ⊆ ηD′ . Given f ∈ ηD′ , consider
ζ+
−1 ◦ (f ◦ ζ+). This is a choice function on the power set of D and hence is
in ηD. Taking the image of this function under ζ+ and resolving yields f , so
f ∈ ζ+(ηD) and thus ηD′ ⊆ ζ+(ηD).
Consider now the generalized notion σ≤ which consists of the class of functions
sending non-empty subsets of a domain to the least natural number in them
and some arbitrary member of the domain otherwise. σ≤ is not isomorphism
invariant.
Proof. Let f be a member of σ{1,2,3}≤ . Let ζ(1) = 2, ζ(2) = 3, and ζ(3) = 1. ζ is




2 6= 1 = f({1, 2}).
In both cases, the admissible functions are not themselves isomorphism invari-
ant. But in the case of η, the set of admissible functions on any domain is
isomorphism invariant. As I just showed, this is not the case for σ≤.
This formal difference between η and σ≤ tracks an intuitive difference be-
tween the admissible functions for each. One way for an admissible function
to be isomorphism variant is for the image of that function under an isomor-
phism to not be admissible. Such is the case with the σ≤-admissible functions.
Call this sort of failure strong isomorphism variance. Another way is for every
isomorphism to take admissible functions to admissible, though not necessarily
identical, functions. Such is the case with the η-admissible functions. Call this
sort of failure weak isomorphism variance. It is strong isomorphism variance
which exposes sensitivity to features of objects in the domain. Thus our con-
ception of the logicality of the denotations of expressions ought to disallow only
those generalized notions containing strongly isomorphism-variant objects.
We can extract a plausible account of logical generalized notions from the
preceding discussion: A generalized notion is logical if and only if its denotation
on any domain is isomorphism invariant. That is, a generalized notion is logical
if the set of admissible members of the type-hierarchy over D that it denotes
on D is isomorphism invariant.24 It is immediate that a generalized notion is
logical if and only if every admissible function in its denotation on a domain is
not strongly isomorphism variant. This criterion is thus in the spirit of Tarski’s
proposal, but allows us to classify the denotations of indefinite expressions such
as variable-binding term operators operators as well as definite expressions.
This criterion is non-trivial since, as demonstrated above, η denotes a logical
generalized notion, whereas σ≤ does not.
24Note that on this way of describing generalized notions, there is only one admissible
member of the appropriate type in the type-hierarchy over a domain for definite predicates
like ‘cat’—the function which takes cats in the domain to T.
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4 The Logical Status of some Variable-Binding Term Op-
erators
We can now apply our criterion of the logical status of generalized notions to
some cases. This will both test the adequacy of our amendment and highlight the
virtues of our shift in framework. We focus on variable-binding term operators
since they are the most salient expressions left out by the earlier account of
logical notions. The model theory for variable-binding term operators has been
developed both under the assumption that no variable-binding term operator is
logical and under the assumption that all are.25 It is somewhat surprising that
no one has attempted a principled demarcation of the logical variable-binding
term operators from the non-logical since the criterion just given is a natural
extension of a well-known demarcation of logicality.26 We will start with ε for
reasons which will become apparent in our discussion of the abstraction operator
‘the number of’.
4.1 The Logical Status of ε
The ε operator is governed by the laws
F (x)→ F (ε.xF (x)) (I)
∀x(F (x)↔ G(x))→ ε.xF (x) = ε.xG(x)27 (E)
Terms like ‘ε.xA(x)’ are to be interpreted similarly to the referential expression
‘an object such that if anything is A, it is one’. The use of the indefinite En-
glish expression ‘an’ in explicating the intended meaning of ε is crucial—ε is an
operator of indefinite choice.
Some indefinite variable-binding term operators like ε can be contextually
eliminated by quantifying over functions. Since we can express that a function
25(Corcoran, Hatcher, and Herring 1972) develops model-theoretic account for variable-
binding term operators on which they are non-logical, (da Costa 1980) one on which they are
all logical.
26The closest anyone has come to my suggestion that we shift from notions to generalized
notions is Newton da Costa who, in his (da Costa 1980), associates each variable-binding
term operator with a “smooth operator” which is something very much like a generalized no-
tion. However, the role of smooth operators is merely to restrict the possible denotations of
expressions like ε. On particular models, each variable-binding term operator denotes some
particular member of the smooth operator associated with a variable-binding term operator.
His use of smooth operators to account for the meaning of this class of expressions is limited
to the stray remark that smooth operators “(are) in some sense the semantical meaning of
a vbto (variable-binding term operator)” (134). Since he is attempting to prove standard
model-theoretic results for a theory including variable-binding term-operators, his rather def-
inite account of the denotations of indefinite expressions is not entirely surprising since the
assignment of a definite value to expressions like ε simplifies their treatment.
27Given an operator σ that obeys I but not E, we can define ε in higher-order logic by means
of ι. Let ε.xφ(x) =df ι.y∃X(∀x(Xx↔ φ(x)) ∧ y = σ.xXx). Thanks to John Burgess for this
point.
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is a choice function using only higher-order logical vocabulary, we can rewrite
φ(ε.xφ(x)) as
∃f [f is a choice function and φ(f(φ(x)))]
Some linguists have attempted to account for indefinite descriptions in natural
language this way.28 This may be the correct way to treat natural language
indefinite articles like ‘a’, but it seems drastic for ε since ε can be conservatively
added to first-order logic whereas adding quantification over functions to first-
order logic is extremely non-conservative. This situation is similar to the case
of identity. We can contextually eliminate = in second-order logic, but this does
not show that we are covertly engaging in higher-order quantification when we
make an identity claim.29
I should also guard the reader against a potential misunderstanding. The
arbitrariness of the intended interpretation of indefinite expressions like ε and
η is not merely epistemic. We do not understand ε.xF (x) as being some par-
ticular F whose identity is determined by its domain of application in some
way we are blocked from knowing. Rather, it is essential to understanding an
indefinite expression like ε.xF (x) that we recognize that its value really is ar-
bitrary in the sense that facts about the domain do not determine which F , if
any, it denotes.30 We should not attempt to explain away the indefiniteness of
expressions like ε.xF (x) by making them covertly definite. Assigning general-
28See (Reinhart 1997) for a careful development of this sort of account of indefinite descrip-
tions. I will bracket the question of whether or not the sort of account I give of the denotation
of a formal expression like ε is plausible as the basis for an account of English indefinites
such as the ‘A’ in ‘A student passed the exam.’ since the complexities of the semantics of
natural language indefinites is well known. Some analyses, such as (Kratzer 1998), do in-
terpret indefinite expressions as denoting choice functions on a domain. Kratzer’s analysis
amounts to interpreting ‘If a student passes, I’ll be thrilled’ as ‘If f(being a student) passes,
I’ll be thrilled’ where f is a free variable assigned a choice function relative to the background
conversational context. Such a choice function can be more or less specific, of course, and
this is a desirable feature since it is plausible that there are both specific and unspecific uses
of indefinites in natural language (Fodor and Sag 1982). On Kratzer’s view, the intended
interpretation of ε would be roughly equivalent to the the indefinite ‘a/an’ in the maximally
unspecific conversational context.
29Note also that we would also need to extend our quantificational apparatus even further
to contextually eliminate ε operators of higher type.
30After writing the above, I discovered that Ofra Magidor and Wylie Breckenridge have
recently suggested an epistemic interpretation of the arbitrariness in claims like ‘Let a be an
arbitrary F ’ (Breckenridge and Magidor 2012). They hold that the totality of facts about a
domain (including primitive semantic facts) determines the meaning of expressions much like
ε.xφ(x) on that domain. Though I am not sure I fully understand their proposal, it seems
untenable: if I were to pick a marble out of a sack of indiscernible marbles, dub it ‘Charlie’,
and replace it, wondering which marble Charlie is would not be senseless, though it would
not be sensible. Likewise, if an omniscient being knows, but I cannot, which object ε.xF (x)
denotes, then it is silly, but not senseless, to wonder which. The same cannot be said about
wondering which F I picked out with ‘Let a be an arbitrary F ’. Their sin is one of insufficient
boldness. They should refuse to let any facts, even “primitive semantic facts”, determine the
value of an arbitrarily chosen object. It is worth mentioning that the isomorphism invariance
criterion misclassifies indefinite expressions even if we adopt their view (which can be modeled
by assigning an indefinite term like ε to a fixed but arbitrarily chosen choice function on the
domain). Thus they should welcome the amendment I suggest.
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ized notions as the denotations of indefinite expressions is a broad-brush though
extensionally adequate account of their meaning. It serves to bring indefinite
expressions into the fold as the sort of expressions whose denotations can be
assessed for logicality.
A trivial modification of the above proof that the generalized notion denoted
by η is isomorphism invariant shows that the generalized notion denoted by ε
is also isomorphism invariant. We further note that there are two obvious ex-
tensions of standard ways of evaluating the denotations of complex expressions
on a domain to a language containing ε terms on the present account of their
meaning. The first pushes the arbitrariness of ε back into the metalanguage, as-
sessing the value of sentences containing ε terms relative to an arbitrary choice
function. The second eliminates arbitrariness in the metalanguage, assessing
the denotations of sentences containing ε terms relative to all choice functions.
Choosing between these candidates is an ideological matter which I cannot en-
ter into here; it is enough to point out that either account can be developed so
that the laws I and E are validated without disrespecting the intended reading of
ε.31 However, to fix ideas, I will briefly sketch how the latter option would work.
The principle requirement of an account of ε is that it preserve the sense in
which ε is an indefinite expression. Let an ε-specification of a domainD be a pair
〈D, f〉 where f is a choice function on the power set of D. For ε-specifications,
we can work with notions instead of generalized notions. For any expression ρ
not containing an ε term, writing ρD for the value of ρ on D, we let ρ〈D,f〉 = ρD.
So, for example, if φ = Fa,
Fa〈D,f〉 = FaD = FD(aD)32
We evaluate ε terms on an ε-specification of D as follows
ε.xφ〈D,f〉 = f(φ〈D,f〉)33
31It is worth briefly noting that we could still motivate a generalized criterion of logicality
even if we accepted, which I do not, a restriction to assigning notions as the denotations
of expressions on domains. We would need an account of an admissible denotation for an
expression on a domain which captures the sense in which distinct choice functions on the
domain are equally good choices to assign as the denotation of ε on that domain. We would
then say that an expression σ is logical (in our generalized sense) if, for all domains D,D′,
the set
{i+(σD) : i is an isomorphism from D to D′}
consists of all and only the admissible denotations for σ on D′. It can easily be seen that
this agrees with our above classification. It is, however, much less natural as the restriction
to notions gives a misleadingly precise account of indefinite expressions.
32We are following tradition in playing a bit fast and loose with the difference between
expressions and what they denote. This should cause no confusion.
33Strictly speaking, we should say that ε.xφ〈D,f〉 = f(φ〈D,f〉) where φ〈D,f〉 is the function
of type (e⇒ t) in the type-hierarchy over D such that φ〈D,f〉(d) = T if and only if d satisfies
‘A(x)’ relative to 〈D, f〉. Such complications involving variable-binding are being ignored for
comprehensibility.
14
This, essentially, is to treat ε as a function constant when evaluating it on an
ε-specification. Given an expression φ, we let
φD = {φ〈D,f〉 : f ∈ εD}
The result is that the denotation of an expression on a domain is the set consist-
ing of the denotations of that expression on all ε-specifications on that domain.
When φ is a referential expression–an expression whose denotation would typi-
cally be a member of D–we have the possibility that φD is a non-singleton set.
This indicates that the value of φ on D is indefinite. When φ is an expression
whose denotation would typically be a truth-value, we have the possibility that
φD is {T}, {T,F}, or {F}.34 We say that φD is true on a domain D if φD = {T}
and false otherwise. The result is that expressions involving epsilon terms are
generally true only when they are true on every specification. So, for exam-
ple, [λ.x(Prime(x) ∨ Composite(x))ε.y y = y]N = {T} and hence is true, yet
[λ.x(Prime(x)ε.y y = y]N = {T, F} = [λ.x(Composite(x)ε.y y = y]N and hence
neither is true.
This is what we ought to expect if ε.y y = y really is indefinite; it is def-
initely prime or composite, but not definitely prime or definitely composite.
The resulting semantics is akin to a supervaluational semantics where we iden-
tify truth with truth on every ε-specification. We can generalize this style of
account easily to accommodate any indefinite specification, letting a specifica-
tion simpliciter be a domain supplemented with a choice of definite denotation
for every indefinite notion. The non-classicality of this semantics is mild—like
standard supervaluational semantics, it is conservative over the base classical
semantics, merely allowing for the indefinite notions which were blocked on the
base semantics.
4.1.1 ε is a Logical Constant
Still, we may worry that ε is not truly a logical constant and thus that our
account of logical generalized notions overgenerates, marking as logical some
indefinite generalized notions that ought to be marked non-logical. The best re-
sponse to this worry is to point out the naturalness of the criterion, the fact that
it correctly classifies the denotations of expressions that are plausibly logical,
and the fact that it extends Tarski’s thought that logical notions are insensitive
to characteristics of the underlying domain to the more general case. I have
argued for the first and third parts of this response already, but to shore up the
second I note a number of reasons to hold that ε is a logical constant. I can see
at least five such reasons:
(1) There is historical precedent for viewing the ε symbol as a logical
constant. We find ε treated as a logical operator by Hilbert, Carnap,
34We are ignoring the complication of partial notions.
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and Bourbaki. 35
(2) The natural language expressions we formalize with η and ι are
so closely related that to mark ι as logical (which requires merely al-
lowing for partial Tarskian notions) without so marking η would be
rather implausible. Since ε is simply η brute-forced into a total func-
tion, it would likewise be implausible to count η as logical without so
counting ε.
(3) I and E can be conservatively added to the standard proof rules or
axioms for standard first-order logic. That is, adding the proof rules
or axioms for ε to a standard deductive system for first-order logic
does not allow us to prove any ε-free sentence we could not already
prove.36 ε thus satisfies Nuel Belnap’s widely accepted existence cri-
teria for logical constants. You might think, following (Restall 2010),
that ε should satisfy the additional requirement that given another
operator τ obeying I and E, ε.xφ(x) should be identical to τ.xψ(x)
when φ(x) and ψ(x) are co-extensional. ε dramatically fails this re-
quirement. Is this problematic? No, since to impose the stronger
requirement is tantamount to requiring that ε be definite. Such a de-
mand is entirely inappropriate.
(4) It is plausible that we tacitly assume in our ordinary mathemati-
cal discourse the acceptability of indefinite expressions that function
similarly to ε. Consider the practice of using expressions like ‘Let a be
an F ’ in the course of proving a generalization. We intend a to pick
out an arbitrary F and treat a afterwards as a referential expression.
In constructing formal proofs, we mirror this practice with the use
of eigenvariables (sometimes called ‘dummy names’).37 As Kit Fine
35See (Bourbaki 2004), (Carnap 1961), and (Hilbert and Ackermann 1939). Of course, these
mathematicians and philosophers had varied attitudes to the importance of separating logical
from mathematical vocabulary. Carnap explicitly argues that ε is a logical constant, albeit a
non-standard one.
36Given the completeness of first-order logic, this means that we also do not extend the first-
order consequence relation by the addition of I and E. Of course, ε is not conservative over
every base theory. ε is not conservative over ZF when we allow ε-terms inside of the separation
schema—we can then prove a version of the axiom of choice. This is to be expected; the epsilon
calculus is more expressive than standard first-order logic. The culprit, however, is not ε, but
rather the underlying unexploited strength of separation. See also fn. 57.
37Note that I am not claiming that we are forced to interpret our practice as involving a
notion like ε and I am certainly not claiming that we have to interpret our formal use of
eigenvariables this way. We can, for example, regard the formal use of eigenvariables as a
mere technical convenience in formal inference. The informal use of expressions like ‘Let a be
an F ’ is more difficult, but some eliminative story could surely be told. My claim is rather
that interpreting our ordinary use of ‘Let a be an F ’ in terms of indefinite expressions like
ε is natural. It provides a useful rational reconstruction of what we are doing when we say
something like ‘Let a be an F ’ and then go on to talk about a. The instrumental use of
eigenvariables provides another such rational reconstruction, but it is less elegant and does
not do justice to our actual practice.
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notes, the epicycles we go through to eliminate eigenvariables in our
formal proofs do little justice to how we actually reason and as he
and Allen Hazen both note, students do better constructing proofs
when they are taught to interpret eigenvariables as denoting objects
arbitrarily chosen.38 If we take mathematical discourse at face value,
we ought to allow the use of indefinite choice. This does not yet
speak directly to the logicality of ε, but to the acceptability of the
arbitrary interpretation of ε. However, our use of these expressions
makes no special claim about the nature of the domain or the content
of the premises or conclusion of the particular proof in which they are
employed. We can thus regard the practice of choosing of arbitrary
satisfiers of formulas as part of the framework of proofs just as we
can so regard the quantifiers and the connectives.39 Being part of the
framework of proofs in this sense is a plausible proof-theoretic crite-
rion of the logicality of expressions.40
(5) Though it is not at all plausible that all the components of a
definition of a logical constant are themselves logical, nevertheless, as
pointed out by Neil Tennant, it is plausible that if we can define σ by
means of a definition employing σ′ as the sole primitive expression,
then if σ is logical, so too is σ′. Applying this to the case of ε, we
note that we can implicitly define ∃ by means of ε (in the presence of
I and E) with the schema ∃xφ(x)↔ φ(ε.xφ(x)).41
This concludes my case for the logical status of the expression ε. Each of the
above is independently compelling; jointly they constitute a strong case for
including ε in our logical vocabulary. Even stronger cases can be mounted for
ι and η. If the expressions ε, ι, and η are logical, then we should expect their
denotations to satisfy our criterion of logicality. The criterion of logicality for
generalized notions gets this exactly right. In the absence of plausible examples
of non-logical expressions whose denotations are marked logical by the criterion
I have given, we need not be worried that the above criterion overgenerates. Of
course, abstraction operators like ‘the number of’ are also variable-binding term
operators, and we might start to worry if our criterion marked the denotation
of abstraction operators as logical. This case is more complicated and deserves
fuller treatment.
38Fine introduces arbitrary objects to correspond to our talk about objects arbitrarily chosen
(Fine 1985). Increasing one’s ontology this way seems less preferable to increasing one’s
ideology with indefinite expressions so as to mirror ordinary reasoning.
39(Hazen 1987) shows how to use ε to replace the use of eigenvariables in a proof-theoretic
setting.
40See (Dosen 1989) for an account of this criterion for the case of formal deductions. A
similar point can be made with respect to the natural language expressions formalized with
η, ι, and ε. As stressed to me by Paul Egré, these expressions have the surface appearance of
functional expressions like quantifiers rather than substantive expressions.
41See (Tennant 1980) for a version of this argument set in a natural deduction context. The
definition of ∃ in terms of ε is due to Hilbert. See (Hilbert and Ackermann 1939).
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4.2 The Logical Status of Abstraction Operators
Traditionally, an abstraction operator O is a function whose range is a subset of
a domain D, whose domain is a type in the type-hierarchy over D, and which
is defined by the following schema:
∀α, β (O(α) = O(β)↔ E(F,G))42
where α, β are nth-order variables and E is an equivalence relation on class over
which α, β range. α and β can be first-order, as in Frege’s direction principle:
The direction of x = the direction of y ↔ x is parallel to y
or second-order, as in Hume’s principle:
The number of F = the number of G↔ F is equinumerous with G43 (HP)
The most interesting abstraction operators are given by higher-order abstraction
principles like HP where E is an equivalence relation on the power set of the do-
main. We will focus our discussion on the second-order case. We need to modify
the traditional definition for our current purpose since we can no longer presume
that expressions denote notions. We will take an abstraction operator to be a
generalized notion—that is, a function from domains to a class of functions,
each of which satisfies the relevant abstraction principle on that domain—with
an associated equivalence relation E.44 We can see such abstraction operators
as collections of ways of indexing the cells of the partition induced by E on the
power set of the domain with objects from the domain. We assume that an
abstraction operator is non-empty on any domain that permits the existence of
a function satisfying the abstraction principle.
Some abstraction operators such as ‘the number of’ have been thought to
be logical in some sense or other. This is a natural thought given the view
of Crispin Wright and other neo-logicists of the Scottish variety that Hume’s
principle is an implicit definition of the concept of cardinal number. On this
view, acceptance of an object-language sentence expressing HP suffices to con-
fer a meaning on the expression ‘the number of’.45 It is plausible that if ‘the
number of’ is implicitly defined by HP, then it inherits the logical status of HP’s
right-hand side.46 Others, such as Aldo Antonelli, have criticized this sort of
42The initial quantifiers will henceforth be dropped for readability where appropriate. n
can be any natural number though we will restrict our attention to second-order abstraction.
43Both examples originate in (Frege 1980).
44Strictly speaking, E is not an equivalence relation, but a function from domains to equiv-
alence relations on them. We simplify for purposes of comprehensibility.
45I will not be overly careful in distinguishing the metalanguage schema HP from the object
language sentence expressing it.
46Of course it is rather difficult to maintain that HP implicitly defines a notion since there
is no unique function that satisfies it. This has led Wright and others to weaken the standard
uniqueness criterion for successful implicit definitions. As will be seen below, we can make
better sense of HP as an implicit definition once we switch to our amended framework.
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claim by arguing that the meaning conferred on abstraction operators like ‘the
number of’ is not permutation invariant, even though the relation of equinu-
merosity is.47 Antonelli’s criticism is cogent within the Tarskian framework he
is working in, but it is not immediately obvious what we should say about this
objection within the amended framework we have adopted.
We can give a precise account of exactly which abstraction operators are
isomorphism invariant and thus logical though we have set aside one way of
understanding the role of abstraction principles. Any view on which the accep-
tance of abstraction principles somehow introduces or brings into existence the
objects that are the range of the functions comprising an abstraction operator
must be treated, if at all, in a way that does not pay proper attention to the
introduction of these objects.48 The trouble is that our criterion makes no pro-
vision for the genesis of the objects making up a domain, treating all objects
comprising it on a par. In light of this, our discussion is restricted to views on
which the functions in an abstraction operator take as their range some subset
of the domain under consideration.49
Let an abstraction operator σ be full if, for every domain D, σD contains
every admissible function. That is, a function f is in σD if and only if non-E-
equivalent members of the power set of D are assigned non-identical objects in
D by f and equivalent members identical objects.
Lemma. An abstraction operator is isomorphism invariant only if it is full.
Proof. Let σ be a non-full abstraction operator with associated equivalence rela-
tion E. There is then, on some domain D, a function f /∈ σD from the power set
of D into D which respects E. Let g be a member of σD. g ∈ σD, so g respects
E. Since |D \Ran(g)|=|D \Ran(f)|, there is a bijection ζ from D \ Ran(g)
to D \ Ran(f). Since g and f respect E, g(A) 6= g(B) if and only if A and B
are not E-equivalent if and only if f(A) 6= f(B). So, for each E-equivalence
class [A], there is a unique member of Ran(f) and a unique member of Ran(g)
mapped to its members by f and g respectively. Given this, we extend ζ to an
automorphism by setting ζ ′(g(A)) to f(A) for every A in the power set of D.
ζ ′+(g) = f , but f /∈ σD, so σ is not invariant under ζ ′ and thus not isomorphism
invariant.
It is an almost immediate corollary of this lemma that logical abstraction op-
47See (Antonelli 2010). I note that Antonelli’s paper inspired me to generalize the Tarskian
criterion of logicality and that I found his objections important and provocative.
48We find the strenuous rejection of this picture of abstraction principles in (Antonelli 2010).
I am in full agreement with Antonelli that this picture is mysterious at best. We further agree
that the clearest way of viewing abstraction operators is as indexings of the partition on the
power set of a domain D with indices drawn from D.
49We can treat such views partially by assuming that the domain with which we assess the
logical status of operators like ‘the number of’ is that which results from the acceptance of
abstraction principles. The logical status of the action of expanding the domain in this way
cannot be treated here.
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erators are indefinite.50 This is not surprising; non-full abstraction operators
differentiate between members of a domain. They thus violate the intuitive con-
straint on logical notions which underwrites the isomorphism invariance criterion
of logicality. In contrast, it is to be expected that full abstraction operators are
often isomorphism invariant and hence logical. This is the case for operators like
‘the number of’ whose associated equivalence relation (henceforth abbreviated
≈) is isomorphism invariant.51 We thus have an almost converse to the above
lemma.
Lemma. A full abstraction operator is isomorphism invariant if its associated
equivalence relation is isomorphism invariant.
Proof. Consider a full abstraction operator σ whose equivalence relation E is
isomorphism invariant. Let D,D′ be isomorphic domains on which σD and σD
′
are non-empty and ζ an isomorphism from D to D′. Remember that ζ+ is
the extension of ζ to the entire type-hierarchy over D. Since E is isomorphism
invariant, ζ+(ED) = ED
′
. Suppose f ∈ σD.
ζ+(f)(ζ+(S)) = ζ+(f)(ζ+(T ))⇔ ζ+(f(S)) = ζ+(f(T )) (df. of ζ+)
⇔ f(S) = f(T ) (ζ+ preserves =)
⇔ ED(S, T ) (f ∈ σD)
⇔ ED
′
(ζ+(S), ζ+(T )) (ζ+(ED) = ED
′
)
So ζ+(f) ∈ σD′ . Conversely, given g ∈ σD′ , there is an f ∈ σD such that
ζ+(f) = g. So ζ+(σD) = σD
′
.
Any abstraction principle whose equivalence relation is isomorphism invariant
defines an isomorphism-invariant, hence logical, abstraction operator when we
take it to denote the corresponding full generalized notion. In fact, the only
logical abstraction operators are those with isomorphism-invariant associated
equivalence relations.
Lemma. An abstraction operator is isomorphism invariant only if its associated
equivalence relation is isomorphism invariant.
Proof. Let σ be an isomorphism-invariant abstraction operator and D,D′ iso-
morphic domains on which σ is non-empty. Given an isomorphism ζ from D,D′,
50We only need the fact that any respectable equivalence relation can be respected by more
than one indexing with members of the underlying domain.
51≈ is not only isomorphism invariant, but expressible in purely logical vocabulary. For
example, we can express F ≈ G thus:




. Let f ∈ σD. We show that ζ+(ED) = ED′ as follows.
ED(S, T )⇔ f(S) = f(T ) (f ∈ σD)
⇔ ζ+(f(S)) = ζ+(f(T )) (ζ+ preserves =)
⇔ ζ+(f)(ζ+(S)) = ζ+(f)(ζ+(T )) (df. of ζ+)
⇔ ED
′
(ζ+(S), ζ+(T )) (ζ+(σD) = σD
′
)
Combining these three lemmas gives us a precise delineation of the logical ab-
straction operators.
Proposition. An abstraction operator σ is logical if and only if it is full and
its associated equivalence relation E is isomorphism invariant.
The only isomorphism-invariant abstraction operator satisfying HP is thus
the full indefinite generalized notion. In fact, all isomorphism-invariant abstrac-
tion operators are indefinite generalized notions. Such generalized notions can
be seen as arbitrary indexings of the partition given by E exactly as we see the
denotation of ε as an arbitrary choice function.52 When we take abstraction
operators more definitely, excluding certain otherwise admissible indexings, we
are importing non-logical content and, as a result, these operators turn out to
be non-logical. Our initial worry about abstraction operators like ‘the number
of’ coming out logical on our revised criterion is thus misplaced. It is only
a very special class of such operators that come out as logical—the indefinite
operators—and these tell us very little about the nature of the members of the
domain, treating all members of the domain alike as potential indexing devices.53
This result allows us to arbitrate the dispute between Wright and Antonelli
alluded to above. When we have an equivalence relation like ≈ which is isomor-
phism invariant, then the domain determines an isomorphism-invariant class of
52The connection with ε can be drawn out more directly. I will show how this can be done
in the next section.
53A helpful reviewer asks whether the logical status of abstraction operators is unchanged
when we add a cross-abstraction identity principle like those considered in (Fine 2008) and
(Cook and Ebert 2005). That is, suppose we have two abstraction operators O1 and O2 given
by abstraction principles formulated with E1 and E2 and the principle
O1(X) = O2(Y )↔ ∀Z[E1(X,Z)↔ E2(Y, Z)]
. Given the logical status of O1 and O2 without such cross-abstraction identity principles,
what can we say about their logical status with the additional constraint? And how should
we treat the denotations of such principles given our interpretation of certain abstraction
operators as indefinite? The issue is too complex to be discussed in detail here, but the
upshot is that, on the most straightforward treatment, if O1 and O2 are both logical without
cross-abstraction identity, then they are still logical with cross-abstraction identity—as far
as the criterion under consideration in this paper is concerned. If exactly one is not logical
without cross-abstraction identity, then enforcing the cross-abstraction identity condition can
force the other to be non-logical as well. Note that enforcing this sort of condition is in
tension with the intuitive picture of the meaning of abstraction operators given above. I hope
to return to this very interesting issue elsewhere.
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functions that satisfy the corresponding abstraction principle. If abstraction op-
erators like ‘the number of’ denote notions instead of generalized notions, then
there is no way to assign a denotation that correlates exactly with the content
given by the abstraction principle. On the other hand, on my amended account
both Wright and Antonelli are right. Antonelli is right that isomorphism-variant
abstraction operators are not intuitively logical as they differentiate between
members of the domain. Wright is right that HP succeeds as an implicit def-
inition of a logical expression for it determines, at least on infinite domains, a
non-empty full generalized notion and one which is moreover both unique and
isomorphism invariant.
Hume’s principle can only succeed in defining a more definite generalized
notion in the presence of background constraints on admissible functions. Such
constraints undermine the logical status of ‘the number of’. Without such back-
ground constraints, we can take HP either as a failed attempt to implicitly define
a definite generalized notion or as a successful attempt to implicitly define an
indefinite generalized notion on infinite domains. The latter option is an inter-
esting way of understanding Hume’s principle that has not been explored in the
literature. We will explore this view in the next section once we have shown
how to explicitly define abstraction operators using a higher-order version of ε.
Now, although we have given an account of the logical abstraction operators
according to our criterion, we might still wonder if such operators are truly
logical. Some logical abstraction operators will be empty on some domains
since there will not be enough members of the domain to index every cell of the
partition induced by E. Such is famously the case with Frege’s basic law V.
(V) The extension of F = the extension of G↔ ∀x (F (x)↔ G(x))
The operator ‘the extension of’ as defined by V is empty on every domain. Less
disastrously, the operator ‘the number of’ is empty on all finite domains since
we need n+1 distinct indices to index the equinumerosity partition of a domain
of size n. Since logical constants are supposed to have universal applicability,
we might want to restrict the class of logical generalized notions to those that
are total—that is, to those that are non-empty on every domain. Consequently,
we might want to say that though the full generalized notion that satisfies HP
is isomorphism invariant, it is nonetheless not truly logical since it is not total.
This is especially pressing when we view HP as an implicit definition since on
finite domains it fails, in a sense, the existence requirement on good implicit
definition.54 This additional constraint goes beyond the criterion of logicality I
am addressing here and I do not want to take a definite stand on this issue—
though I do want to note two things.
First, the general operation of abstraction on logical equivalence relations is
54That is, there exists a class of functions satisfying HP on finite domains, but only in the
trivial sense that the empty set contains all such functions.
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truly logical. That is, the binary abstraction operator § given by
§(E,F ) = §(E,G)↔ E(F,G)
where E is restricted to isomorphism-invariant equivalence relations denotes an
isomorphism-invariant total generalized notion. Using ℘(D) for the power set of
a domain D, §D is a class of partial functions from ℘(℘(D)×℘(D))×℘(D) into
D. On finite domains, no member of §D will be defined for pairs E,F where E is
equinumerosity. On infinite domains, no member of §D will be defined for pairs
E,F where E is the equivalence relation of having finite symmetric difference.55
On no domain will a member of §D be defined for E, the equivalence relation
of co-extensionality. We can view all such unary abstraction operators as cases
of this binary abstraction operator where we fix the equivalence relation E. So
even if some abstraction operators are not truly logical since they are not total,
they can be obtained in particular domains from abstraction operators that are
truly logical.
Second, for an abstraction operator σ whose equivalence relation is not only
isomorphism invariant, but also expressible in logical vocabulary, we can define
a total generalized notion which agrees with σ on domains where it is non-
empty. We can then formulate versions of abstraction principles much like
HP in entirely logical vocabulary. This construction avoids the problem with
the existence requirement on implicit definitions since it is immediate that the
generalized notion defined is non-empty. Since this construction is of some
independent interest, we will spend a bit more time developing it.
4.3 The Logical Status of ε-abstraction Operators
The above arguments for the logicality of ε can be extended in a natural way to
justify the logical status of ε’s higher-order cousin ε′ which attaches to formulas
with free function variables of type ((e ⇒ t) ⇒ e). We read an expression like
ε′.f A(f) as denoting an arbitrary function of that type which satisfies A(f) if
anything does. Given D, ε′D is:
{f | f : ℘(D℘(D))→ D℘(D) where f(S) ∈ S if S 6= ∅}.
It is easily checked that ε′D is isomorphism invariant. Letting ε′ be governed by
the laws
A(f)→ A(ε′.fA(f)) (I′)
∀f(A(f)↔ B(f))→ ε′.fA(f) = ε′.fB(f) (E′)
it can be seen that ε′ conservatively extends the full standard third-order con-
sequence relation.56 We thus have good reason to think that ε′ is a logical
55See (Boolos 2007). This equivalence relation is isomorphism invariant and can be ex-
pressed in entirely logical vocabulary.
56This follows from the fact that we can extend any full standard model M of a third-order
language L to a model M∗ of L+ ε′ that assigns a fixed choice function of type
((((e⇒ t)⇒ e)⇒ t)⇒ ((e⇒ t)⇒ e))
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constant if ε is.57 And ε is.
We can use ε′ to define analogues of certain abstraction operators such as
‘the number of’. Let H(f) be the formula:
∀F∀G f(F ) = f(G)↔ F ≈ G
where f is a function variable of type ((e⇒ t)⇒ e). H(f) holds of a function g
from the power set of D to D only if g indexes the equinumerosity partition of
the power set of D with members of D. The following is an almost immediate
consequence of I′:
H(ε′.fH(f))↔ ∃fH(f) (Q)
Since I′ entails Q, Q is a logical truth. Expanding and rewriting ‘ε′f.H(f)’ as
N, we obtain:
∀F∀G[N(F ) = N(G)↔ F ≈ G]↔ ∃f∀F∀G[f(F ) = f(G)↔ F ≈ G]
the left-hand side of which is the familiar-looking principle
N(F ) = N(G)↔ F ≈ G. (HPA)
ND is an arbitrary function from the power set of D into D that indexes the
equivalence classes of the power set of D under ≈ in any domain which permits
such an indexing, an arbitrary function otherwise. It is never undefined. HPA is
essentially an indefinite version of Hume’s principle. Since Q is a logical truth,
HPA is a logical consequence of ∃fH(f). But ∃fH(f) is true in a domain if and
only if the domain is infinite. Thus HPA is a logical consequence of a statement
expressing that the domain is infinite. It is sufficient to derive second-order
arithmetic in higher-order logic.
On domains in which HP implicitly defines a non-empty full abstraction op-
erator, HPA will hold if and only if HP does. Making the further assumption
that HP is false if it defines an empty abstraction operator, HPA is logically
equivalent to HP. So, in a sense, HPA is an explicit rendition of the intended
interpretation of HP. The construction is perfectly general. For any abstraction
operator σ whose associated equivalence relation can be expressed in a (higher-
order) language L, we can define a total generalized notion (an ε-abstraction
operator) σ′ in L+ε′ which agrees with σ on cases where it is non-empty. More-
over, if the equivalence relation E is expressible in purely logical vocabulary, our
to the symbol ε′. M∗ then validates both E′ and I′.
57Since standard third-order logic is not complete, the applicability of these results to
higher-order deductive systems is non-trivial. We can prove, however, that E′ and I′ can
be conservatively added to standard deductive systems for third-order logic if we restrict the
comprehension schema to formulas not containing ε′. This follows from the completeness
of this deductive system for Henkin models of third-order logic. If we add all the instances
of the comprehension schema, E′ and I′ suffice to derive the axiom of choice. However, we
can conservatively add E′ and I′ to the deductive system comprised of all the comprehension
schemas, the quantifier rules, and the axiom of choice.
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defined generalized notion will be truly logical, being both isomorphism invari-
ant and defined on every domain. Since expressions definable in terms of other
logical constants are intuitively logical, this is a welcome result. Of course, the
left-hand portion of the instance of I′ defining σ′ will be false in domains where
σ is empty since ND will then be an arbitrary function which does not respect
≈D. But this is as it should be.
For example, let ≈′ be the relation that holds between the F s and the Gs
if and only if the symmetric difference of the F s and the Gs is finite. Consider
the “nuisance principle”(Boolos 2007)
S(F ) = S(G)↔ F ≈′ G. (NP)
S is non-empty only in finite domains. We can give the same ε′ treatment of the
nuisance principle that we gave HP. Call the resulting indefinite version of the
nuisance principle NPA. NPA, like HPA, is the left-hand side of a biconditional
logical truth Q′, the right-hand side of which is its existential generalization.
Both HPA and NPA are consistent, but jointly inconsistent. Is this problem-
atic? No. Their inconsistency rests on the fact that a domain cannot be both
finite and infinite and hence there cannot be an indexing of the equivalence
classes under both ≈ and ≈′. So even though Q and Q′ are both logical truths
and expressible in purely logical vocabulary, their left-hand sides are never true
together. Though, if true, HPA remains true under every reinterpretation of its
non-logical content, it is not a logical truth since it is false in finite domains. It
is thus not a logical truth in the modern sense deriving from Tarski. Likewise
with NPA. The situation is similar to that obtaining between ∃x∃y x 6= y and
∃x∀y x = y. The former is true only in domains containing at least two things.
The latter is true in only singleton domains. Neither contains any non-logical
vocabulary, but neither is a logical truth or a logical falsehood.
The ε′ construction has the virtue of highlighting and improving the sug-
gested indefinite interpretation of abstraction operators. ε-abstraction operators
are explicitly arbitrary indexings of the partition induced by the equivalence re-
lation E. ε-abstraction operators have two advantages over simple abstraction
operators. First, an operator like ND is a total generalized notion, being de-
fined on every domain. Second, HPA is not an implicit definition as HP is, but
is rather the left-hand side of a biconditional consequence of the axioms for ε′,
the right-hand side of which states the truth conditions for the left-hand side.
We can thus avoid worrying about how the stipulated truth of HP manages to
implicitly define the ‘the number of’ given that it does not wear its indefinite
character on its sleeve and is non-empty only on infinite domains.
One payoff of our ε-abstraction construction is a defensible and novel form of
structuralism about the mathematical objects.58 Call the objects characterized
58This view resembles eliminative or in re structuralist views rather than mystical or ante
rem views since it does not interpret N as ranging over a distinguished class of abstract objects.
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using ε′ abstracts. Abstracts are simply arbitrary indexing devices drawn from
the underlying domain. They have no special properties–being just arbitrary
ordinary objects—and none of their ordinary properties intrude on their role
as indexing devices.59 This form of structuralism allows us to avoid many of
the objections to introducing mathematical objects with abstraction principles.
Since we are not laying down implicit definitions, but rather explicitly defining
ε-abstraction operators, we do not have to worry about jointly consistent, but
pairwise inconsistent abstraction principles. There are such collections of ab-
straction principles, but the right-hand sides of the principles like Q that they
are the left-hand sides of are never jointly true, so we have good reason to not
accept the entire collection.60 Likewise, if the range of distinct abstraction oper-
ators were disjoint, then accepting even jointly consistent abstraction principles
could require that there be more abstracts than objects. This is problematic if
we expect that abstracts are members of the domain. This is the problem of
“hyperinflation” raised by Kit Fine.61 On the structuralist view I have sketched,
there is no such problem since the range of abstraction operators defined with
ε′ can and often do overlap.62
ε-abstraction principles have no special epistemological status. We are in no
better position to know HPA than we are to know its existential generalization.
Mutatis mutandis with NPA. This allows us to take a nuanced position on the
logical character of Hume’s principle. Principles like HPA allow us to shift from
talking about a partitioning of the power set of the domain to talking about
representatives for each cell of the partition. Q guarantees that we can do this
if there exists a mapping of cells to representatives. The existence of such a
mapping is equivalent to the claim that there are suitably many or suitably few
things. Since the size of the domain is a substantial fact on which logic takes
A full discussion of this approach to Hume’s principle and how it squares with various members
of the structuralist family is beyond the scope of this paper. I hope to return to this issue
elsewhere.
59Defending this picture as an account of our concept of number cannot be attempted
here. Such a defense would have to investigate whether the indefinite indexings defined by N
captured enough of how we conceive of numbers and how much is enough in this regard. This
project is vastly beyond the scope of this paper.
60If we developed our structuralist account in terms of implicit definitions of indefinite
operators as suggested in the previous section, then we would still have to deal with the bad
company objection. This is a strong reason to favor ε-abstraction as the basis for this type of
structuralism.
61See (Fine 2008, pg. 6). It is worth noting that Fine very briefly discusses the costs and
benefits of adopting a variable ‘the number of’ operator (op. cit. pg. 25, fn. 13) though it is
not entirely clear what sort of operator he has in mind.
62This may remind the reader of the so-called “Caesar” problem. On the ε-abstraction
account of HPA, this problem is misguided. If there is a function that satisfies H(f), then
there is a function g satisfying H(f) such that g(F ) is the object denoted by b. So we can
use the famed conqueror of Gaul as a representative if there are enough additional things. On
the other hand, no statement of the form ‘The number of F is b’ where b is a constant term
denoting an object in our domain will be provable or refutable on the basis of the definition
of N, the axioms governing ε′, and our background logic. And this is how it should be given
the view that numbers are arbitrary indexing devices.
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no stand, the truth of HPA is likewise a substantial fact on which logic takes
no stand. We can thus disentangle the logical content of the HPA from the
substantial content. N is a logical constant in the fullest sense. And
H(ε′.fH(f))↔ ∃fH(f)
is a logical truth. It is thus a logical fact that the claim that there are infinitely
many things suffices for the truth of HPA and consequently for second-order
arithmetic interpreted in the structuralist fashion mooted above. The claim
that the universe is infinite directly entails the ε-abstraction version of Hume’s
principle. But neither HPA nor the claims of second-order arithmetic suitably
interpreted are logical truths.
Why we should care that Hume’s principle and the like are purely logical
if they are not logical truths? ∃x∃yx 6= y is, even if true and purely logi-
cal, not especially interesting. On the other hand, the ε-abstraction version
of HP guarantees, on the basis of logic alone, that we can introduce referen-
tial devices corresponding to the cells of the equinumerosity partition on the
power set of a domain. That is, it allows us to introduce things playing the
role of—or being!—numbers on the mere basis of logic, given the non-logically
true, but purely logical fact that the universe is infinite. The fact that this
version of Hume’s principle is purely logical is actually slightly misleading way
of describing what is so interesting about it. The most important fact is that
the equivalence of this principle with the claim that the universe is infinite is a
logical truth in the modern—and, obviously, the older—sense.
Of course, they would be logical truths in the older account mentioned in
my discussion of Tarski’s account of logical truth and logical consequence. As I
mentioned above, I prefer and work with the modern account, but I do not argue
for it here. For this older account, my result is even better: Hume’s principle,
suitably formulated with ε-abstraction principles, is an obvious logical truth
if the universe happens to be infinite. And suitably formulated principles are
logical truths if the universe happens to be finite. If we adopt the structuralist
viewpoint suggested above, we can do a substantial amount of mathematics
in pure logic without abandoning the thought that numerical expressions like
‘the number of trees in my yard’ are referential expressions without taking on
additional commitments to problematic ontology. What we need is merely that
indefinite expressions like ε and ε′ are logical expressions and complex terms like
N(F ) are logical—yet still referential—expressions.
5 Conclusion
With the exception of partial generalized notions like ι, all generalized notions
newly classified as logical are indefinite in the sense defined above. Accepting in-
definite generalized notions as our account of the denotations of expressions like
ε or η amounts to an expansion of our ideology. It is not entirely dissimilar to
27
the now widely accepted increase in ideology obtained by accepting irreducibly
plural quantification.63 Accepting this new ideology allows us to give a seman-
tic account of certain indefinite expressions without perverting their intended
meaning. The new ideology is useful as well, providing new ways of interpreting
certain infamous abstraction operators as well as allowing the direct construc-
tion of ε-abstraction operators.
The naturalness of both the suggested amendment of the framework and the
resulting criterion of logicality, the ability to adequately represent the meaning of
indefinite expressions like ε and η, and the additional understanding of abstrac-
tion operators and their ε-abstraction correlates are sufficient reason to amend
Tarski’s framework. The switch to generalized notions vastly improves our un-
derstanding of the logical character of the indefinite expressions that figure in
our informal logical practice. As with Tarski’s original account, our broadened
invariance criterion for generalized notions yields a plausible necessary condi-
tion for being a logical constant–logical constants denote isomorphism-invariant
generalized notions. This, in turn, yields an improved account of logical truth
and consequence, allowing us to better represent the logical relations among
various claims involving indefinite expressions.
References
Antonelli, G. 2010. Notions of Invariance for Abstraction Principles.
Philosophia Mathematica 18 (3): 276–292.
Barwise, J. 1974. Axioms for Abstract Model Theory. Annals of Mathematical
Logic 7 (2-3): 221–265.
Bonnay, D. 2008. Logicality and Invariance. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 14 (1):
29–68.
Boolos, G. 1984. To be is to be a value of a variable (or to be some values of
some variables). The Journal of Philosophy 81 (8): 430–449.
Boolos, G. 2007. Is Hume’s Principle Analytic? In The Arché Papers on the
Mathematics of Abstraction, 3–15. Springer.
Bourbaki, N. 2004. Elements of Mathematics: Theory of Sets. Springer Ver-
lag.
Breckenridge, W. and O. Magidor. 2012. Arbitrary Reference. Philosophical
Studies 158 (3): 377–400.
Carnap, R. 1961. On the Use of Hilbert’s ε-operator in Scientific Theories.
In Essays on the Foundations of Mathematics, eds. Y. Bar-Hillel and
A. Fraenkel, 156–164. Jerusalem, The Magnus Press.
Cook, R. 2007. The Arché Papers on the Mathematics of Abstraction.
Springer.
Cook, R. T. and P. A. Ebert. 2005. Abstraction and Identity. Dialectica 59 (2):
121–139.
63Irreducibly plural quantification was initially advocated in (Boolos 1984).
28
Corcoran, J., W. Hatcher, and J. Herring. 1972. Variable Binding Term Op-
erators. Mathematical Logic Quarterly 18 (12): 177–182.
da Costa, N. 1980. A Model-Theoretical Approach to Variable Binding Term
Operators. Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics 99: 133–
162.
Dosen, K. 1989. Logical Constants as Punctuation Marks. Notre Dame Jour-
nal of Formal Logic 30 (3): 362–381.
Dummett, M. 1993. The Logical Basis of Metaphysics. Harvard University
Press.
Etchemendy, J. 1990. The Concept of Logical Consequence. Harvard Univer-
sity Press Cambridge.
Feferman, S. 1999. Logic, Logics, and Logicism. Notre Dame Journal of For-
mal Logic 40 (1): 31–54.
Fine, K. 1985. Reasoning with Arbitrary Objects. Blackwell.
Fine, K. 2008. The Limits of Abstraction. Oxford University Press.
Fodor, J. and I. Sag. 1982. Referential and Quantificational Indefinites. Lin-
guistics and Philosophy 5 (3): 355–398.
Frege, G. 1980. The Foundations of Arithmetic: A Logico-Mathematical En-
quiry into the Concept of Number. Northwestern University Press.
Gentzen, G. 1935. Untersuchungen über das logische schließen. i. Mathema-
tische zeitschrift 39 (1): 176–210.
Gómez-Torrente, M. 2000. A Note on Formality and Logical Consequence.
Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (5): 529–539.
Hanson, W. 1997. The concept of logical consequence. The philosophical re-
view 106 (3): 365–409.
Hazen, A. 1987. Natural Deduction and Hilbert’s ε-Operator. Journal of
Philosophical Logic 16 (4): 411–421.
Hilbert, D. and W. Ackermann. 1939. Grundlagen der Mathematik, Volume 2.
Berlin.
Kratzer, A. 1998. Scope or Pseudoscope? Are there Wide-Scope Indefinites?
Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy : 163–196.
Lindström, P. 1966. First-order Predicate Logic with Generalized Quantifiers.
Theoria 32 (3): 186–195.
Mancosu, P. 2010. Fixed-versus Variable-domain Interpretations of TarskiÕs
Account of Logical Consequence. Philosophy Compass 5 (9): 745–759.
Mautner, F. 1946. An Extension of Klein’s Erlanger Program: Logic as
Invariant-Theory. American Journal of Mathematics 68 (3): 345–384.
McGee, V. 1996. Logical Operations. Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (6):
567–580.
Peters, S. and D. Westerståhl. 2006. Quantifiers in Language and Logic.
Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Reinhart, T. 1997. Quantifier Scope: How Labor is Divided between QR and
Choice Functions. Linguistics and Philosophy 20 (4): 335–397.
29
Restall, G. 2010. Proof Theory and Meaning: On the Context of Deducibility.
Scott, D. 1967. Existence and Description in Formal Logic. Bertrand Russell,
Philosopher of the Century : 181–200.
Sher, G. 1991. The Bounds of Logic: A Generalized Viewpoint.
Tarski, A. 1936. On the Concept of Logical Consequence. In Logic, Semantics,
Metamathematics. Oxford University Press, USA.
Tarski, A. 1986. What are Logical Notions? History and Philosophy of
Logic 7 (2): 143–154.
Tarski, A. and S. R. Givant. 1987. A Formalization of Set Theory without
Variables, Volume 41. American Mathematical Society.
Tennant, N. 1980. On ε and ∃. Analysis 40 (1): 5.
Väänänen, J. 2004. Barwise: Abstract Model Theory and Generalized Quan-
tifiers. The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 10 (1): 37–53.
30
